Col Christos Flessas, Espionage, Greece (2024 - 2026)

Preliminary Report: The Case of Christos Flessas

Col Christos Flessas

On February 5, 2026, Greek authorities arrested Christos Flessas, a 54-year-old senior colonel in the Hellenic Air Force, for allegedly spying for China. Flessas has an extensive background in military service. He held various positions, including Commander of a Telecommunications and RADAR Squadron and Head of Support. He also served as a contract implementation officer for missile systems. His experience includes being the Director of Support and Deputy Commander of the 128th SETI in Kavouri, Attica. Additionally, he was the Head of Communications for the Air Command of the Hellenic Air Force in Cyprus. His credentials include serving as a NATO evaluator in Communication and Information Systems.

Recruitment and Contact

Col Flessas was reportedly approached online through LinkedIn by individuals claiming to represent Chinese companies. Initial discussions revolved around geostrategic policy. Allegedly, Flessas met with Chinese agents while attending a NATO conference in an undisclosed European country. Following this, he traveled to China on his own accord, claiming it was for language study. During this trip, PRC Intelligence Officers trained him in the use of specialized software for covert communication.

Upon returning to Greece, Flessas began photographing classified documents. He sent these documents to China using encryption software. His actions raise serious concerns about national security.

Financial Motivation

Flessas' primary motivation appears to be financial gain. Reports indicate he received between 5,000 and 15,000 euros per transaction. Investigators are currently examining cryptocurrency transactions linked to him. He reportedly used a separate cell phone to take photographs of classified documents and deleted the evidence from his phone after sending the information.

Flessas also provided Greek counterintelligence with the name of a Chinese General Officer involved in his activities. Public reports suggest that he attempted to recruit others. At least two additional individuals are under investigation, one of whom is female. Surveillance footage captured him meeting with a Chinese intelligence asset twice in Athens in 2025. During one meeting, a Caucasian female was also present.

Status: Alleged

Tradecraft

• Online recruitment (likely via LinkedIn)

• Undeclared travel to China

• Recruitment and tradecraft training in China

• PRC Intelligence Officers used the guise of Chinese companies

• Meetings in a third country

• Personal meetings in Athens

• Photographing classified documents using a separate cell phone

• Deleting evidence from his cell phone

• Utilizing covert communication software

• Payments made in foreign currencies and cryptocurrencies through electronic wallets and ATMs

  
  

Note: Flessas did not declare his trip to his superiors. There is no indication in his service bio that he took time off for study or travel in China.

Conclusion

This report serves as a preliminary assessment based on the available information. As investigations continue, updates will be provided. The implications of this case are significant, especially in the context of espionage and national security. It highlights the vulnerabilities that exist within military and governmental structures. The methods employed by Flessas underscore the need for heightened awareness and robust counterintelligence measures.

In the face of such threats, organizations must remain vigilant. They should implement comprehensive strategies to detect, counter, and prevent espionage activities. The goal is to safeguard sensitive information and maintain national security.

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This is only a preliminary assessment based on limited information. It will be updated as more information becomes available.