Michael Charles Schena (2022-2025)

LinkedIn

From 2022 to 2025, Michael Charles Schena conducted espionage against the United States on behalf of China’s Ministry of State Security. 

Schena was a Foreign Affairs Officer with the US Department of State for nearly 19 years.  He was not a diplomat but had multiple overseas trips working in US diplomatic missions for up to six months each.  Prior to joining the State Department, he taught English in Shaoxing, China for three months. 

April 11, 2022, Schena received a message on LinkedIn from a an individual “Jason” who said he worked for an international consulting company and inquired about Schena's interest in working with them.  Over weeks, Schena and Jason attempted to schedule video teleconference calls and identify a successful method for Jason to pay Schena. Jason sent Schena $500. Approximately six hours after that payment was made, Jason asked Schena to resend the "pictures" with a higher quality resolution.  

On June 19, 2022, Schena emailed Jason the text from a State Department document, which had sensitive but unclassified (SBU) markings. However, Schena removed some of the classification markings from the document prior to sending it. Two days later, (June 21, 2022), there was an online payment of $500 to Schena’s account.

In May 2022 and again in March 2023, Schena received payments from various account names, at least ten transactions from the MSS officer(s) Schena was engaging with online.  For these money transfers Schena used his wife’s online accounts.  In August 2024, Schena traveled to Peru and met an MSS officer (likely handler Jason) who provided him $10,000 and an iPhone 14 cellphone. The iPhone 14 was intended as a covert communication device for Schena to image and/or transmit information. *

On February 17, 2025, Schena accessed the Department of State computer system from his home in Alexandria, Virginia and downloaded an SBU document.  Schena then attempted to email the document from his work email account to his personal email account. After receiving an alert that emailing the SBU information may violate State Dept. policy, Schena re-classified his email as UNCLASSIFIED and sent the email to his personal email account. Schena then deleted the document from his work laptop computer.

Schena accessed at least five documents from the State Dept’s classified computer system (CLASSNET) which carries up to SECRET level documents.  Schena photographed five SECRET documents, which were displayed on his computer screen, with the Apple iPhone 14 given to him in Peru. He then opened an application on the iPhone and typed a message in an application. He then inserted the photographs that he had just taken into the messages. Schena then deleted the photographs from the camera roll. Shortly thereafter, Schena left the State Dept. building and was arrested.

Status: Guilty

Motivation: Money

Tradecraft

·         Schena was targeted, approached, and recruited online through social media.

·         MSS officers used cover for status of international consulting company.

·         MSS officer(s) used multiple online accounts to transfer funds.

·         Third country meeting in Peru.

·         MSS provided a sterile phone for collection.

·         Schena took photographs of computer screens.

·         Schena destroyed evidence of photos from his phone.

·         Payments made in cash and online.

·         Schena used his wife’s online accounts to receive some funds.

·         The MSS uses invoices. Schena’s iCloud had an invoice (In Chinese) for the receipt of $10,000 and an iPhone 14 mobile device from Jason.

·         Schena had access to SBU material at home through his work issued laptop computer.

* It is likely that Schena was introduced to “David”, Jason’s supervisor in Peru.