MSS Intelligence Operations in New Jersey

Overview of the Case

On October 20, 2022, a federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey returned a sealed indictment charging four Chinese nationals with conspiracy to act in the United States as illegal agents of a foreign government under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (18 U.S.C. § 371 / 18 U.S.C. § 951(a)).

The were four primary defendants operating on behalf of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and its civilian intelligence agency, the Ministry of State Security (MSS):

1. Wang Lin: A senior MSS intelligence officer since at least late 1988 who served as the Director of the Institute for International Studies (IIS) at Ocean University of China as a cover identity.

2. Bi Hongwei: An MSS intelligence officer operating on behalf of the PRC.

3. Dong Ting (a/k/a "Chelsea Dong"): An MSS intelligence officer subordinate to Wang Lin at the IIS cover institution.

4. Wang Qiang: A PRC citizen and national residing in Qingdao, China, who carried out operational tasks for the MSS.

Key Individuals Targeted and Recruited

• Individual-1: A former U.S. federal law enforcement officer and state homeland security official with expertise in counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and undercover operations, serving as a professor at a U.S. research university. MSS officers repeatedly attempted to recruit and task Individual-1.

• Co-Conspirator-1 (Zhang Mingxi AKA Sushi John*): A PRC citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States residing in New Jersey. Zhang served as a recruited intermediary ("cutout") who carried out tasks inside the United States on direct orders from Wang Lin and Bi Hongwei.

Operation Timeline (2008–2018)

1. Targeting of Individual-1 (2008 & 2018)

• 2008 Olympic Games Security Pretext: Under the academic cover of the IIS, Wang Lin and Dong Ting invited Individual-1 to China on an all-expenses-paid trip, ostensibly to consult on security for the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

• Requests for Equipment and Protest Suppression: During the 2008 trip, MSS officers requested that Individual-1 assist in procuring U.S. fingerprint technology/equipment and shipping it to China. They also pressed Individual-1 to take action to stop planned Olympic torch relay protests in the U.S., which Individual-1 refused.

• 2018 Qingdao Safe House & Cash Payment: In 2018, Wang Lin and Dong Ting again brought Individual-1 to Qingdao for security consultations. Over two days, MSS officers debriefed Individual-1 at a furnished condominium functioning as an intelligence safe house and paid Individual-1 $7,000 in cash.

• Commercial Front Contract Attempt: During the 2018 trip, MSS officers presented Individual-1 with a consulting contract with a Chinese firm. The comnapy’s "core value" was the "national interest and national security" of China. The stated objectives of the contract were:

  • "protect the national interest and Chinese enterprises' overseas interest[s]"

  • "build sources and channels to collect security information."

2. Operations with Zhang & Financial Handoffs (2016)

• Bahamas Meeting via Cuba (April 2016): Wang Lin and Bi Hongwei traveled to Cuba and then to Nassau, Bahamas. Zhang traveled from New York to the Bahamas to meet them.

• Zhang received $35,000 with orders to deliver it to an unnamed individual in Skillman, New Jersey, to support MSS intelligence activities. In May 2016, Zhang executed the delivery and obtained a written receipt.

3. Wang Qiang's U.S. Trip & Wiretapped Admissions (Sept–Oct 2016)

• New Jersey Visit: Wang Qiang traveled to New Jersey on a B2 tourist visa alongside family members of Zhang and stayed at Zhang’s residence.

• Recorded Conversations: U.S. authorities recorded extensive conversations between Zhang and Wang Qiang detailing their covert activities:

  • Operational Fear: Both expressed significant anxiety regarding U.S. counter-intelligence capabilities, noting that "the Americans are really capable" and that if caught, the Chinese government would deny involvement and "abandon" them.

  • Financial Motivation: Zhang referred to espionage as "just a business" where "they pay you for each job done," expressing willingness to obtain "U.S. high tech" if paid enough.

  • Border Concerns: Wang Qiang voiced worry that U.S. border officials at the airport had installed surveillance equipment on his phone and expressed concern over confidential contacts on his device, including numbers in North Korea.

 Espionage Tradecraft Analysis

The indictment illustrates specific human intelligence (HUMINT) and operational security (OPSEC) methods employed by the MSS:

• Academic Cover Institutions: MSS officers disguised their identity by operating under the umbrella of the Institute for International Studies (IIS) at Ocean University of China. This allowed them to initiate contact with U.S. academics and security experts under the pretext of legitimate academic exchanges.

• Use of "Cutouts" / Third-Party Intermediaries: To avoid placing trained intelligence officers at risk of arrest on U.S. soil, the MSS relied on U.S.-based trusted intermediaries like Zhang to execute tasks, make payments, and transfer materials locally.

• Neutral / Third-Country Meetings: When meeting U.S.-based cutouts, senior MSS officers traveled to third countries (such as the Bahamas via Cuba) rather than entering the U.S. directly, minimizing exposure to U.S. law enforcement.

• Commercial & Corporate Fronts: The MSS utilized third-party Chinese commercial companies—whose core values emphasized "national security"—to offer formal contracts to foreign targets, providing a commercial veneer for espionage recruitment.

• Safe Houses & Debriefing Facilities: Rather than meeting in public or official state offices, officers debriefed recruited targets in furnished residential condominiums serving as secure locations.

• Cash Financial Operations: Payments to foreign targets ($35,000) were handled strictly in physical cash, often utilizing formal handoff receipts to maintain internal accounting.

• Post-Retirement Travel Security Restrictions: Conversations between operatives revealed strict internal state controls on former intelligence officers, including a seven-year ban on foreign travel following retirement to ensure sensitive administrative and operational secrets expire before officers can leave China.

STATUS: Convicted and Fugitives.

By Nicholas Eftimiades