Yang Yiming (2024 – 2026) Covert Action

Mirror Media

Yang Yiming (楊藝明) was conducting covert influence operations against the Czech Republic and collecting against national politicians.  He is the first person ever prosecuted under the Czech Republic’s new foreign‑interference statute (§318a, “unauthorized activity on behalf of a foreign power”). Between 2024 and 2026, Czech counterintelligence concluded that he operated in Prague as a covert asset of China’s Ministry of State Security while officially accredited as a reporter for the Chinese Communist Party–run newspaper Guangming Daily.  Arrested on January 17, 2026, he now faces up to 5 years in prison under a new Czech national‑security law.

Bottom Line Up Front

Yang Yiming used a journalistic cover to conduct a two‑year intelligence operation targeting pro‑Taiwan Czech and Slovak politicians, collecting information for the MSS.  The collection effort was targeted towards information to compromise Czech politicians.  Yang also conducted interviews with Czech and Slovakian politicians sympathetic openly admiring of the Chinese political system specifically for a Chinese language audience. 

1. Identity and Cover

• Affiliation: Guangming Daily (光明日报), a CCP-controlled newspaper whose editor-in-chief sits on China’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. This gives the outlet authority to dispatch “correspondents” who often double as intelligence collectors.

• Arrival in Prague: Early 2024 on a legitimate press visa repeatedly renewed by the Czech Foreign Ministry.

• Use of Operational Cover: Conducted interviews with Czech and Slovak politicians, especially those critical of the EU or supportive of China—an approach consistent with MSS influence tradecraft.

2. Intelligence Targeting Focus

Primary Targets: Pro‑Taiwan Czech political leadership:

Czech intelligence states Yang focused on politicians who:

• Supported Taiwan

• Advocated a tougher EU stance toward China

• Were influential in Czech–Taiwan relations

Named targets include:

• Miloš Vystrčil, President of the Czech Senate (visited Taiwan in 2020 and 2023).

• Markéta Pekarová Adamová, former Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies.

• Olga Lomová, prominent Czech sinologist.

Collection and Influence Activities

• Sought compromising information that could be used for pressure or blackmail.

·         Systematically selected interviewees who were China friendly, “pragmatic,” or critical of the EU/US line toward China, both in Czechia and Slovakia.*

3. Surveillance, Arrest, and Detention

Surveillance

BIS monitored Yang for more than two years, concluding he was working directly for the MSS.

Arrest

• Date: January 17–18, 2026

• Operation: Conducted jointly by BIS and Czech police.

• Charge: “Unauthorized activity on behalf of a foreign power” (§318a), introduced in 2023 to counter Russian and Chinese hybrid operations.

Pre‑Trial Detention

• Yang has been held since January 19, 2026, due to risk of flight.

• Appeals against detention were rejected.

4. Legal Significance

First-ever prosecution under §318a

This is the first case brought under the Czech Republic’s revised national‑security law targeting foreign intelligence collection.

Potential Penalty

Maximum 5 years imprisonment.

5. Geopolitical Implications

Possible Hostage Diplomacy

• Czech media reported that China detained a Czech businessman in June 2026, possibly as leverage for Yang’s release.

• Czech intelligence had anticipated Beijing might attempt a prisoner exchange.

European Context

Yang’s case is part of a broader pattern of:

• Chinese intelligence using journalistic cover

• Targeting political elites

• Conducting influence operations across Europe

6. Why This Case Matters

1. Legal precedent: First use of a new law designed to counter foreign political warfare.

2. Operational clarity: Provides rare public insight into MSS tradecraft in Europe.

3. Taiwan dimension: Unusual focus on pro‑Taiwan politicians, highlighting Beijing’s sensitivity to European support for Taipei.

4. Diplomatic leverage: Triggered reciprocal detentions and raised concerns about hostage diplomacy.

7. Tradecraft

1.      Yang visited the Chinese Embassy in Prague twice monthly to pass collected intelligence.

2.      Employed cover for status/action as a journalist.

a.       Used interviews to influence China’s geopolitical objectives.

8. Political Influence Activities Chart

Politician	Country	Party & Role at the Time	Narrative Stance & Article Focus in Guangming Daily
Jan Zahradil	CZ	Former MEP (ODS); Chair of the EU–China Friendship Group	Eurosceptic / Anti-EU Mainstream: Criticized mainstream EU foreign policy and US unilateralism; promoted closer Beijing trade ties across a long interview and commentary.
Kateřina Konečná	CZ	Leader of the Communist Party (KSČM)	Pro-China / Anti-EU: Praised the Chinese governance model as a symbol of peace and global stability while openly criticizing Brussels.
Ľuboš Blaha	SK	Member of European Parliament; prominent Smer politician	Pro-China / Anti-US: Heavily downplayed the Western alliance, criticized American global influence, and praised China as an alternative partner.
Artur Bekmatov	SK	Adviser to Slovak PM; Chairman of Socialists Party	Pro-China / Anti-Capitalist: Framed his meeting with Yang as a normal interview, later posing with Xi Jinping’s The Governance of China and praising China as an "alternative to capitalism".
Richard Raši	SK	Speaker of the Slovak Parliament (Hlas)	Pragmatic / Economic Partner: Conducted a highly diplomatic interview focusing on bilateral trade, cultural exchange, and regional infrastructure.
Michal Bartek	SK	Hlas Party politician	Pragmatic / Economic Partner: Interviewed to highlight a growing group of young Slovak politicians favoring cooperative, trade-first relations with Beijing

Source: Guangming Daily and Czech Security Information Service (BIS) case records

STATUS: Accused.